Abstract We develop a classification to score the potential of corporate audit committees to be financially literate, as defined in this paper, based on listing requirements of the NYSE, promulgated late in 1999. We score audit committees of approximately 300 large companies in 2000 and 2004, and of a subsample in 1996 as well. We find that scores did not change between 1996 and 2000, but have improved significantly since. Still, the audit committees have room for improved financial literacy in the sense that we define. Finally, we find evidence of superior stock market returns to companies who have improved the potential for financial literacy, as we measure it, of their audit committees over the last four years. The improvers in our sample enjoyed annualized abnormal, excess returns of 4.6 percent per year more than those which did not improve.
(a) Each audit committee shall consist of at least three directors, all of whom have no relationship to the company that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the company ("Independent"); (b) Each member of the audit committee shall be financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the company's Board of Directors in its business judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment to the audit committee; and …. 
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Our work reports on the progress towards Audit Committee Financial Literacy. We organize this presentation into
• review of history from 1999 on financial literacy,
• discussion of the meaning of financial literacy,
• scores of the financial literacy capabilities, as determined by career paths, of the audit committees of 300 large companies, and
• results of a financial literacy quiz taken by over 1,100 board members
• differential stock market returns to portfolios of our companies segregated by the apparent financial literacy of the companies' audit committees..
Brief History of Financial Literacy
In 1999, the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, convened by the NYSE and the NASD, issued a report recommending that every publicly traded company have an audit committee comprising at least three financially literate members. It did not define financial literacy other than to say, "Such 'literacy' signifies the ability to read and understand fundamental financial statements, including a company's balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement." Dealers, 1999. 6 Some professors of corporate finance have bristled at our suggestions that their performance on the financial literacy quiz described below suggests a lack of such literacy. These professors don't mind being however, as they allow a CFO to be the ACfE. In the course of our work, we have learned that not all CFOs demonstrate accounting literacy. There are several career paths to CFO, some from within the company:
• Controller,
• Treasurer,
• General counsel, and
• Operating executive.
Other CFO career paths, from outside the company, have been:
• Public accountant (auditor), and
• Investment banker.
Only the controller and public accountant have career paths ensuring accounting literacy.
The treasurer understands corporate finance, such as how to raise funds and how to talk to the financial press or analysts, but typically hasn't had a need to understand accounting. The investment banker understands how to raise funds, but aside from some knowledge (now obsolete) of purchase and pooling issues, has typically not had a need to understand accounting. 
Financial (Accounting) Literacy
We have developed criteria for financial literacy in presentations to board members. We base the criteria on the mandatory disclosure of Critical Accounting Policies and
Estimates section of the Management's Discussion and Analysis section of the annual report. All the numbers in the financial statements (except the date) are estimates.
Management must tell us which ones matter. We base our criteria for financial literacy on those judgments:
1. Understand the transactions that require the judgments described. [We think all board members should understand how the company earns income-makes money, as the layman likes to say, which means that all board members should master this step.]
2. Understand the accounting and measurement issues for the policies and estimates.
3. Understand management's choices among policies and methods for making estimates and the reasons for them.
4. Understand the implications of management choices for potential manipulation of financial reporting.
While these criteria seem straightforward, even minimal, we have anecdotal push-back.
The audit committee chairman of one of the largest and best known U.S. companies said, "These criteria are wrong. I know I'm good enough to be the audit committee chairman, 10 Cunningham [2004] explores the inherent contradiction of having the audit committee hire the auditor, as SOX requires, and then having the auditor assess the effectiveness of the audit committee, as the PCAOB, created by SOX, requires. He suggests the states should create certifications for audit committees. We think readers will be comfortable with this classification, with the possible exception of the distinction between the scores of 4 and 3. Many, likely more than half, of presentday CFOs are 3s. The most common career path to CFO has been through the position of 
Scoring Audit Committees
We grade each audit committee in our sample with a 3-part grade that can range from 111
[worst] to 444 [best] . If a company has more than three members on its audit committee, we use the top three scores. 12 Appendix B provides scoring protocol details designed to allow any reader to replicate our procedures, but there are cases that require judgment.
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In all, we have scored audit committees for about 300 companies, having at least three persons each. Thus, we have scored more than 900 individuals.
Companies Rated
We rated the 200 largest and 100 smallest companies in the Fortune 1000 list, as published in April 2004, provided those companies provided data in proxy statements on audit committees for the year 1999 or 2000. Appendix B gives the details of inclusions 11 More than one CFO treats as a badge of honor the fact that he (these are always men) doesn't know GAAP, but relies on a trusted controller. 12 We view financial literacy as lexicographic in the sense that one person of score 4 is better than five people with score 2. This view does not affect our work, only the order of the rows and columns presented in the transition matrices, Exhibits 1-3. 13 During the process of scoring the individuals, we isolated some difficult-to-classify cases and scored them independently. As a result, we devised more rules, detailed in Appendix B, to deal with the ambiguities we encountered. 
Hall of Fame
No company has an audit committee with a score of 444, which likely means that board nominating committees think not every audit committee member needs to understand GAAP in his or her own head. 
At the Bottom
One company from the top 200, CVS, has an audit committees currently scoring only 221. Thirty-six from the largest 200 companies score 222, including BerkshireHathaway, ChevronTexaco, and Citigroup. The score of 2 indicates a CEO whose proxy bio reports no experience as a financial executive. Berkshire-Hathaway might assert, "We 14 Farber [2004] found, in a sample of firms cited for violation of SEC Rule 10b-5, a positive association between fraud detection and subsequent improvements in the quality of the board of directors and audit committee activity. 15 One of its members receiving a score of 4 might be a 3. The member has never been an auditor nor a controller, but has been on the board of the AICPA and a trustee of the Financial Accounting Foundation. 16 See the data at http://securities.stanford.edu/ which suggests that any one company has about a 2 percent chance of being involved in accounting-related scandals in any one year. This suggests that any one company has at best a 98 percent chance of avoiding accounting-related scandal, assuming complete serial dependence. The chance that 37 events each with 98 percent of success will all have a successful outcome is .98 37 which is about 47.5 percent, which means the chances of at least one failure is about 52.5 percent. these data, the two-sided p-value of equal probabilities is also less than .0001. Here also the probability of a change for the better appears statistically significantly elevated.
Timing of Changes in Regulations Appear to Matter
Have things changed since the new listing requirements have taken effect? Yes. We examine that question by creating the cross-classification in Exhibit 3, paralleling Exhibits 1 and 2, for the 50 largest companies in our list between 1996 and 2000.
Again, we specify a null hypothesis that conditional on observing a classifiable change, changes for the better and for the worse are equally likely. Twenty-eight of the 50 have classifiable changes, 15 for the better and 13 for the worse. Based on these data, the two-sided p-value of equal probabilities is 0.47. These changes indicate no departure from equal probabilities of a change up and a change down. In other words, behavior since the new listing requirements looks different.
Market Reaction to Audit Committee Potential for Financial Literacy
The market reacts as though it prefers an audit committee with more potential for financial, that is accounting, literacy. Defond, Hann, and Hu [2004] found significantly positive cumulative abnormal residuals around the appointment of accounting financial experts to the audit committee, but not around the appointment of non-accounting financial experts or directors without financial expertise. Davidson, et al. [2004] investigated stock returns surrounding 136 appointments of directors to audit committees, and found significantly positive stock price reaction when new members of audit committees have financial expertise. We report our own tests next.
We partitioned those of our 300 companies having sufficient market data for our into two groups for analysis. One group comprises 131 companies whose audit committees improved; a second group of "not improved" companies comprises 130
whose audit committee ratings were unchanged and 29 whose ratings declined 18 ; and a third, ignored group comprises the 10 companies whose changes were indeterminate (such as a change from score of 322 to 421). 19 For each company we computed a total excess return, relative to an equally weighted market index, for the four-year period from the beginning of 2000 through the end of 2003. 20 Then, we computed the average excess return for the 138 improvers separately from that of the 133 non-improvers, both overall 17 We calculated monthly "abnormal returns" for each company having CRSP returns data for at least 30 months of our initial estimation period (January 1996-December 1999) and for all 48 months of the "target period" for our analysis (January 2000-December 2003).
18 By "improve" we mean a Pareto improvement in the potential for financial literacy reflected in our scores. To improve, none of the three individual scores for members of the committee gets worse and at least one gets better. 19 An alternative analysis in which we classified these 10 indeterminate cases as 7 "Improved" and 3 "Not improved" based on lexicographic ordering produced virtually identical results. 20 We calculated as "excess returns," also known as "abnormal returns," the prediction errors from a market model in logarithmic returns, using an equally weighted index of NYSE and AMEX firms to represent the market factor for listed firms and an equally weighted index of NASDAQ firms to represent the market factor for NASDAQ firms. We specified our market models in terms of returns defined, for firm i in month t, as r i,t = ln((p i,t +d i,t )/p i,t-1 ), where "ln" denotes the natural logarithm, p i,t the closing price in month t, and d i,t dividends accrued in month t. For each sample firm we recalculated the coefficients of the market model for each successive "target year" in 2000-2003, using as estimation data all available returns from the immediately preceding four-year period. This procedure produced a sample of 271 companies having complete monthly abnormal returns data for 2000-2003. We calculated a "Total Abnormal Return" for each company by summing the monthly abnormal returns across all four years. We calculated the "Average Abnormal Return" for each specified group of companies as the simple average of Total Abnormal Returns for individual companies.
and within subgroups based on the audit committee ratings for 2000. Exhibit 4 reports the results.
Over the 4-year period 2000-2003, the improvers generated a cumulative excess return of 19.73 percent greater than that of the non-improvers, for an annual average of 4.6 percent (compounded annually). We also computed the difference in the excess returns between the improvers and the non-improvers as a function of the starting score.
Note for example, that 100 (= 46 + 54) companies started with scores of 311 or 321 or 322. Fifty-four of these improved and forty-six did not. In this group, the improvers out-(excess)-earned the non-improvers by over 31 percent during the four years, or 7 percent per year. These differences are statistically significant in terms of a permutation test on the t statistic for the effect of "Improved" status in a two-way analysis of variance (p = 0.01).
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The excess returns difference between improvers and non-improvers is not monotonic across sub-groups. We have not tested why this might be so, but we hypothesize that, like us, the market prefers quality over quantity, and views as 411 as preferable to 333. We prefer, but don't know if the market prefers, one accounting expert, joined by two university presidents, to three corporate treasurers or investment bankers. The improvement from a 222 or worse is less likely to improve to 4xx than is a 333, which, if it improves, must add at least one 4.
Costs and Benefits of a More Literate Audit Committee
21 Specifically, this two-way analysis of variance included main effects for initial-score-group and improvement-status. Because we expect that the standard assumptions for the validity of parametric ANOVA test statistics do not apply to our data, we applied a nonparametric method to the ANOVA t statistic for the effect of "Improved." We used a Monte Carlo method to approximate the permutation distribution of the t statistic under permutation of the "Improved" and "Not improved" labeling of companies within each subgroup based on initial committee structure. In a random sample of 1,000 permutations, the recalculated t statistic was greater than or equal to our sample value in 10 cases, yielding an estimated p-value of 0.010, with a 99 percent upper confidence bound of 0.020.
What does it cost to improve the potential literacy of the audit committee? The out-ofpocket costs is likely zero, but surely less than $100,000 per year for replacing a 3 or 2 or 1 with a member who scores 4. Consider that we know, anecdotally, dozens of potential 4s [think former partners at Arthur Andersen or retirees from the Big 4 accounting firms who must leave the firm at age 60 or 61] who can do the work. These 4s don't bring glamour, but they are abundant. On average for companies with market capitalization of $10 billion, companies which improved their audit committees' potential literacy had increases in wealth of about $580 million per year greater than the companies whose audit committees didn't improve. You can hire a lot of ex-Andersen partners for $600 million per year.
Results of Financial Literacy Quiz
We have offered a multiple-choice quiz covering a variety of accounting and audit committee topics to attendees at the Chicago GSB, Stanford Law School, and Wharton multiple-day executive education sessions for board members. Over the past four years, more than 1,400 attendees, almost all board members or CEOs or CFOs or general counsel, have taken this quiz. The 25-item quiz contains 13 questions whose answers are in the textbook we have used to teach first-quarter, first-year MBA students, 2 items of basic audit committee issues, and 7 items required clear understanding of some topics currently pertinent for many companies, but advanced. See Exhibit 5 for a compilation of question topics, our taxonomy of difficulty level, and the results.
The median score on this quiz is about 8 correct out of 25, and this score has remained constant over several years' of testing. The results point to financial illiteracy.
The individual quiz takers, self-selected from larger audiences, are likely people more 
Survey of Efforts to Track or Improve Financial Literacy
Three years ago, we sent a short questionnaire to audit committee chairs. The survey's meat asked:
• 
Summary of the Results
We received 27 responses, 25 from audit committee chairs and 2 from CFOs. None of the respondents reported any formal process to assess the financial literacy of the audit committee members. The majority of the respondents report that the someone-general counsel, other board members, management, search firms-screen candidates before nominating them. Two-thirds assessed the financial literacy of the potential audit 22 One of us can report that in over 35 years of teaching, many students have said the equivalent of, "I don't have time to take the [optional] exam in class you're about to give, but, don't worry, I know the material. I'm just too busy." Not once has such a student excelled on the final examination in the same course. We think unlikely that those who have attended these sessions and chosen not to take the quiz would have done better than those who did.
committee members by looking at the background of the candidates and evaluating their academic and professional experience. Two responded that they do not assess the financial literacy. Another two responded that they perform the assessment informally and gave no details of the assessment process. The remaining responded that the board reviews the members but they did not mention the process by which they review their financial literacy.
Not one of the respondents indicated that their board had any formal process to increase financial literacy of the audit committee members. Several report that board members attended seminars, read publications, and hired consultants to meet with them and management to review financial issues. We found neither evidence of formal training nor systematic steps taken by the firm to increase the literacy of the audit committee members. None of the respondents indicated that they had any way of evaluating the impact of practices that they do follow to increase financial literacy.
Other Research Bearing on These Subjects
We have mentioned the results of several studies by others at appropriate places above.
Our review of the literature found some other studies bearing, at least tangentially, on this work.
• Xie, et al. [2001] found that board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals.
• Felo et al. [2003] found that the composition (expertise and independence) and size of the audit committee positively relates to the quality of financial reporting, as measured by an independent rating service.
• Dezoort and Salterio [2004] found, in an experimental study with about 70 subjects who were board members, that greater independent director experience and greater audit knowledge was associated with higher audit committee member support for an auditor who advocated a "substance over form" approach in the dispute with client management.
• Song and Windram [2000] found in their study of UK companies over the decade of the 1990s that financial literacy and audit committee meeting frequency all reduce the probability of standard violations in financial reporting.
Conclusions
Our title tells all but the details. Audit committee members appear not yet literate if by financial literate we mean understanding accounting at the level of an introductory MBA accounting course. Boards appear to have begun the process of improving financial literacy. Shareholders appear to benefit from the company's having a more literate audit committee and the magnitude of the return dwarfs the costs of increasing that literacy.
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Appendix A. Illustration of Financial Literacy Criteria, Based on Kodak's Disclosure
We illustrate the 4-point criteria for financial literacy using Kodak management's disclosure of its critical accounting policies and estimates. Kodak mentions inventory issues in its note: "Kodak reduces the carrying value of its inventory based on estimates of what is excess, slow-moving and obsolete, as well as inventory whose carrying value is in excess of net realizable value…." 23 1. Understand the transactions that cause management to have to make a judgment about inventory carrying value.
Kodak purchases more raw materials or manufactures other items for inventory than it sells during a period. It has ending inventories on its balance sheet. The accounting equation requires a valuation [Kodak calls it carrying value] of those inventories in order to measure cost of good sold. Kodak tells us this importantly affects its reported numbers.
2. What choices among accounting methods and estimates must management make in reporting on those transactions?
In Kodak's case, management must make four sorts of choices to measure inventory carrying value: cost basis (for example, historical cost, replacement cost, lower of cost or market), frequency of inventory calculations (periodic or perpetual), cost inclusion rules for manufactured inventory (where on the spectrum of direct versus absorption costing to put itself), and whether to use a cost flow assumption and if so, which one (specific identification or a choice between LIFO, FIFO, weighted average). This illustration focuses only the last of these, the cost flow assumption.
Which unit's costs flow into cost of goods sold during the period-the cost of the first units produced (FIFO), or the cost of the last units produced (LIFO), or the cost of the next unit produced (NIFO), or an averaging approach, or even specific identification. US GAAP allow all of these except NIFO; other countries forbid LIFO as well.
3. What did management choose and why? Kodak chose LIFO. From the outside, we can guess that Kodak chose LIFO because of its effects on deferrals of tax payments. An audit committee member needn't guess.
For example, choosing LIFO instead of FIFO means reporting lower income in times of rising prices, but deferring income tax payments until the company dips into old LIFO layers.
And: management can manipulate end-of-period purchases to manipulate income under LIFO.
And: the audit committee should be ready to understand why entering a new line of business will enable avoiding decrements to LIFO layers and avoiding higher tax payments than would occur without the new line. 4: Individual is a CPA, or has had controller experience, or worked as a partner in a Big 5 firm (D&T, E&Y, PwC, AA, KPMG, or one of their predecessor firms) , or is a professor of accounting, or has obvious accounting experience-such as serving on the FASB or similar. 3:
Individual does not qualify for 4 and has CFO experience, or is a professor of finance, or is an executive in a financial services business or investment banking or investment management or venture capital.
2:
Individual does not qualify for a 3 and has general management experience in a public company, is a professor in a business school or in an economics discipline, or is a private investor. 1:
Individual comes from a non-business background such as law, medicine, engineering, and non-profits, or is professor of a non-business discipline.
Individuals receive the highest score that they qualify for. Note that other directorships do not influence scoring,. So, for example, board members of a financial services company do not qualify for a 3 unless the work experience outside of the directorship qualifies them as such.
Scoring is independent of a person's status as chairperson or ACfE.
6. Following this, Score B, records a single score per individual using all available information for that person. For example, if an individual is on the boards of two companies and one proxy lists him as a former CFO while the other lists him as a former controller, then Score A grades the two as a 3 and a 4, respectively, but Score B uses 4 for both companies. As such, individuals get the same score in the same year for all companies in which they are a director. 7. Use Score B from this point forward. Aggregate for a single company the Score B data into a single list of 4s, 3s, etc. for each year. Use only the top three scores for the company, so, for example, a company with 6 audit committee members with grades of 4,3,2,2,2,1 would receivea grade of 432. If a company's audit committee had fewer than three members, then assign a score of 1 to the vacant spot or spots. Ranking, from best to worst, is 444, 443, 442, 441, 433, 432, 431, 422, 421, 411, 333, 332, 331, 322, 321, 311, 222, 221, 211, 111 . Many?   111  211  221  222  311  321  322  331  332  333  411  421  422  431  432  433  441  442  443  444   2000  Score  -444   --------------------444 2000 Score 1 443 --------------------------------------444 2000 Score   443   ----------------- 111 211 221 222 311 321 322 331  332  333 411 421 422  431 432  433 441 442 443 444  -1  1  13  1  8  19  3  18  5  -3  5  -10  9  -2  2  -100 We specify as our null hypothesis that, conditional on observing a classifiable change, changes for the better and for the worse are equally probable, both having probability 0.5. The observed proportion of "more qualified" outcomes among the 66 classifiable changes was 84.8%. Based on these data, the two-sided p-value of a test of equal probabilities is less than 0.0001.
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